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INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property has an exclusion problem. Much of the current
controversy over intellectual property appears to stem from the excessive
exclusion that intellectual property law affords the holders of rights—rights that
derogate from the public domain and prevent what would otherwise be use that
does not directly harm anyone. To the economist, it is the nature of information
as a resource that causes us our ambivalence about exclusion rights to
information: if information can be consumed at zero marginal cost, exclusion
is an unalloyed bad. The only rationale for intellectual property would be as an
incentive to produce the information in the first place, but once it is produced,
we implement exclusion only with regret and should not do so if there is a
cheaper way to provide an incentive for the production of information. Given
that exclusion looks like a colossal waste, many would hold that one or more
of these alternatives—from prizes to social recognition—simply has to be
better.1
And intellectual property is not the only area in which exclusion proves
* Fessenden Professor of Law and Director of the Project on the Foundations of Private Law,
Harvard Law School. I thank Andrew Lewis for excellent research assistance. All errors are mine.
1. See, e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY
(2008); see also JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008).
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controversial. As with information, many would claim that property rights of
any sort in water, and especially those involving prior appropriation as in the
American West, are inherently wrong and violate human rights.2 Similar ire is
directed against proposals for property rights in the radio spectrum and on the
Internet.3
From these perspectives, property itself would appear to be the problem. It
is property that erects the metaphorical fences around information, spectrum,
water, and other resources with public goods characteristics; it is, therefore,
property that so many would like to do away with.
In this lecture, I would like to propose a somewhat different diagnosis.
Property is indeed at the heart of these questions over rights in fluid resources.
However, I will argue that the picture of property is incomplete. Once we
understand how property meets its own challenges, we will be in a position to
see how problems involving intellectual property, water, spectrum, and so on—
what I will call “fluid resources”—can be, and sometimes are, solved rather
than created by means of property institutions. In particular, I will show that
fluid resources are very likely to call for hybrid property systems combining
private and common elements—a semicommons—and require much more
fine-tuning through rules governing property use than do more-familiar kinds
of resources.
To begin with, the notion of exclusion is not uncontroversial in property.
People disagree about how central exclusion is to the notion of property (if there
is such a notion!), and how far it should be pushed.4 Further, if we do
2. See, e.g., Karen Bakker, The “Commons” Versus the “Commodity”: Alter-globalization,
Anti-privatization and the Human Right to Water in the Global South, 39 ANTIPODE 430 (2007);
Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right: The Myth of Markets for Water, 25
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 317 (2000).
3. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE
FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); see also Jon M. Peha, Approaches to
Spectrum Sharing, IEEE COMM. MAG. (Feb. 2005).
4. See, e.g., J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 30–32 (1996); J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF
PROPERTY IN LAW 68–74 (1997); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U.
TORONTO L.J. 275 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV.
730, 731 (1998); see also Henry E. Smith, The Thing About Exclusion, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP.
RTS. J. 95 (2014). Trespass is a sovereignty-based tort. See Arthur Ripstein, Beyond the Harm
Principle, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215 (2006). For use-based critiques of emphasizing exclusion, see,
e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Gridlock, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 17–28 (2011)
(reviewing MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008)); Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting
the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 395–97 (2003). For critiques of the importance of
exclusion, see, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 37–55 (2011); Gregory
S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745
(2009).
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implement exclusion strategies in “regular” property, they lead to many of the
same problems identified in the controversies over intellectual property, water,
and the other mentioned resources, but often to a lesser extent. Whether for
fluid or regular resources, exclusion always comes at a cost in terms of
delineation and enforcement effort—and in terms of forgone harmless use.
Intellectual property and water law problems are indeed problems, but they are
property problems.
And yet, the difficulties in intellectual property, water law, spectrum, and
the like are in a sense special, and bear a family resemblance. I will argue here
that all these resources are “fluid” resources, and that it is precisely the
intersection of fluid resources with the institutions of property that inevitably
leads to challenges in managing potentially conflicting use. Once we can
account for the nature of that use and for the actual function of the property
institutions, we will see that property law is not the villain of this piece, but a
highly flexible set of tools that allows for a surprisingly wide range of
institutional responses to conflict.
What is a fluid resource? I am going to argue that certain resources are not
just hard to bound, but are even hard to separate into legal things. Their uses
are hard to isolate, period. Just as a legal thing is similar to, but different from,
a physical thing, so economic and legal “fluidity” is similar to but different
from physical fluidity—physical fluidity will typically lead to legal fluidity.
Physical fluids deform continuously under shearing stress, and they flow in
characteristic ways; this makes it difficult to keep track of particular bits of a
fluid (compared to solids), and the study of fluids is statistical and aggregate.5
For our purposes, legally and economically fluid resources will be defined as
those for which separation between groups of uses is difficult.6 As we will see,
one way to pick out a broad class of uses for protection is to define a legal thing
and protect it using an exclusion strategy. By definition, this is difficult in the
case of fluid resource because any separation into classes of uses is itself
difficult. Not impossible, though. The question becomes which set of
separations and other devices to employ—if any—to manage the complex set
of potentially conflicting uses of these resources. The problem is similar to,
but a more extreme version of, that obtaining in the case of more-familiar nonfluid resources.
For the fluid resources we care most about, their fluidity leads to a dilemma.
Many fluid resources are valued by multiple users and for multiple types of

5. See, e.g., BRUCE R. MUNSON ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FLUID MECHANICS 3 (7th ed.
2013).
6. For an early take on this idea, see generally Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The
Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445 (2008).
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uses, sometimes on very different scales. At the same time, because of the fluid
nature of the resource, the uses cannot easily be kept separate for purposes of
tracking by the legal system. This has implications for how property will be
delineated in such resources, if at all. The strategies for delineation range
between two poles.7 On one side are exclusion strategies, in which rough
proxies of access are used to protect a range of uses. Trespass and the ad
coelum rule are the prototypical methods of implementing such a strategy. At
the other pole is governance, whose proxies focus in on smaller classes of uses
for special treatment. Many institutions can zero in on particularly important
uses; nuisance, servitudes, and land use regulation all do so, even though very
different institutions supply them. In the case of fluid resources, we will see
that the cost of exclusion and the benefits of singling out uses both push away
from exclusion and toward governance, as a matter of degree.
Thus, these resources are often subjected to a regime of semicommons, in
which different interacting uses are subject to different property regimes, some
private and some common.8 The problem is that when the uses interact and are
not fully legally separated, actors can engage in strategic behavior—a user in
one use may proceed with a view to gaining in another class of uses. The
incentives in a hybrid system can be worse than in pure private property or pure
commons; sometimes strategic behavior will allow shifting more than a
proportionate cost to others and grabbing disproportionate benefits.9 A
historical example of a semicommons is the open-field system of medieval and
early modern Europe, where peasants would own scattered long thin strips for
purposes of grain-growing, which they would be obligated to throw open for
common grazing after harvest and in fallow periods.10 Circumstantial evidence
suggests that the thin, scattered strips prevented strategic behavior—
participants could not, during the common-use period favor, with extra manure
land that would be theirs in the private-use period, and could not direct
damaging trampling towards the strips of others.11
This essay will begin with the notion of fluid property and the special
problems to which it gives rise. Part II will show how these problems are dealt
with in water law. In Part III, a similar picture is painted for intellectual
property. The parallel institutions in both areas are more extremely
governance-oriented, as we would expect from the delineation cost account. I
7. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S467 (2002).
8. Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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conclude with some thoughts on the use of property talk in intellectual property.
I. FLUID PROPERTY
If exclusion is controversial in water and intellectual property, this very
controversy is not unknown to property law either. In property theory itself
there is a lively debate about the importance of, and desirability or
undesirability of, exclusion. One might think, though, that the debate is
different, in that intellectual property and, for some purposes, water are nonrival
resources. This is true, but it should be kept in mind that one of the costs of
exclusion in regular property is forgone use. Not every use that an excluded
actor would make of a resource would conflict with that of an owner or
possessor. And yet the right to exclude, combined with transaction costs, will
preclude that kind of use, along with those that are truly harmful. Trespass does
not include a harm requirement, unlike the law of nuisance and many other
torts.
As noted in the introduction, exclusion has been a flashpoint in intellectual
property as well as property. In other works, I suggest that a fixation on
exclusion—for or against—is often a stand-in for ambivalence over the role of
the thing in property. Thus, the right to exclude can be exaggerated as a sine
qua non of property because it is doing the work of the thing as a starting
point.12 While it is true that notions of possession and exclusion strategies key
off the thing more directly than do governance strategies, effacing the role of
the thing makes the “right to exclude” look like a particularly important stick
in the bundle or an essential feature, which runs into trouble when we get to
property rights such as easements. By the same token, those who seek to
deemphasize exclusion are often the ones who are most against property as a
right in a thing, or who dismiss talk of things altogether.13
When it comes to intellectual property, it might appear that some of the
debate over exclusive rights might likewise be really about the problematic
status of things in intellectual property. And there is some truth to this, too.
Nevertheless, the problem may loom larger than it needs to because of an
impoverished notion of legal thing.
Whether something is a thing depends on whether it can be treated
separately. This separation need not be absolute or complete. Separation is
also not the same phenomenon as exclusion.14 One can have a thing without
12. Smith, The Thing About Exclusion, supra note 4.
13. See, e.g., Tom Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69, 69–
80 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1980). For discussion, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith,
What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 357–58, 365 (2001).
14. PENNER, supra note 4.
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exclusion, but exclusion depends on the thing. Frederick Pollock defines a legal
thing as “some possible matter of rights and duties conceived as a whole and
apart from all others, just as, in the world of common experience, whatever can
be separately perceived is a thing.”15 Picking up on this line of thought, James
Penner sets forth, in addition to his thesis that exclusion is the formal basis of
property (his exclusion thesis), an equally important separation thesis, which is
a theory of the “thinghood” of objects of property:
Only those “things” in the world which are contingently associated with
any particular owner may be objects of property; as a function of the
nature of this contingency, in theory nothing of normative consequence
beyond the fact that the ownership has changed occurs when an object
of property is alienated to another.16
The nature of the thing helps determine what kind of property we can have
in it. There are actually two kinds of “thing” that are involved in property:
actual things in the world and legal things. The latter depends on the former.
As Pollock notes:
[O]n the whole perhaps we have good ground for saying that the “thing”
of legal contemplation, even when we have to do with a material object,
is not precisely the object as we find it in common experience, but rather
the entirety of its possible legal relations to persons. We say entirety,
not sum, because the capacity of being conceived as a distinct whole is
a necessary attribute of an individual thing. What the relations of a
person to a thing can be must depend in fact on the nature of the thing
as continuous or discontinuous, corporeal or incorporeal, and in law on
the character and the extent of the powers of use and disposal which
particular systems of law may recognize.17
Thus, the characteristics of physical things are easy for the law to track
when defining legal things. An umbrella as a legal thing is not that interestingly
different from a physical umbrella. When it comes to land, legal definition does
more work, under the ad coelum rule.18 Exclusion, through the law of trespass,
15. Frederick Pollock, What Is a Thing?, 10 L.Q. REV. 318 (1894); see also FREDERICK
POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 121 (1896) (“A thing is, in law, some possible matter of
rights and duties conceived as a whole and apart from all others, just as, in the world of common
experience, whatever can be separately perceived is a thing.”).
16. PENNER, supra note 4, at 111.
17. Pollock, supra note 15, at 320–21.
18. See generally Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 2083 (2009).
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keys off this definition of the legal thing.19 Finally, when it comes to
intangibles, legal definition does the most work.20
There are costs and benefits to legal thinghood. In terms of benefits, the
question is how much our additional efforts at defining a legal thing promote
the purposes of property. For tangible objects this includes managing literally
conflicting uses. In the case of intangibles, uses do not conflict in this way.
Instead, the purpose of defining intangibles is to have a method to get at
something else—a set of activities, some of which may involve tangible
resources.21 Thus, in intellectual property, the information itself is nonrival,
but the legal thing is a stand-in for the activities and resources surrounding the
information, much of which comes under the heading of commercialization.
Therefore, labor, lab space, and resources used in marketing are all rival. The
returns from them are appropriable and more easily transferable because we
can get at them through rights in legal things like inventions and expressions.
This brings us to the cost side of the ledger. While it is true that we tend to
think of things as things when we want to define ownership in them, 22 not
everything is equally easy to delineate as a thing. As already mentioned, there
is an everyday ontology involving physical things that may well preexist our
desire to establish ownership. So, in the case of personal property, the ability
to regard something as a separate thing is often not much of a constraint on
property. Cultural artifacts would be easy to treat as transferable commodities,
but sometimes legislation prevents this. The problem with slavery is that it is
wrong—people are not legal things or objects of rights—not that it is hard to
delineate rights in people. Organs in place are not fully separable, but if one
can own one leg of mutton,23 we might be able to delineate property rights in
organs in place. Nonetheless, this would be offensive from a moral and policy
point of view.
The constraint on the cost side of delineating things, and by extension rights
to them, looms large for fluid property. Fluid property is almost by definition
property in things that are hard to separate. Hard and thus costly, but not
impossible.
Separation into legal things is an example of modularity in law.24
19. See generally id.
20. See Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 381, 417–19 (2005); see also Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property
Rights, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1075, 1080–92 (1997).
21. See generally Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, supra note 18.
22. Tony Honoré, Ownership, in MAKING LAW BIND 161, 179–81 (Oxford University Press
1987).
23. Pollock, supra note 15, at 318–19.
24. See generally Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691
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Modularity is a matter of degree.25 If clusters of interactions can be found in
which elements interact within the component, but not across component
boundaries, the system is fully decomposable and modularity can be
complete.26
More common is what Herbert Simon called neardecomposability.27 A nearly decomposable system can be separated into
modules such that that interaction is intense within the modules and relatively
sparse between them.28 The intense interactions can thus happen inside without
causing hard-to-predict ripple effects throughout the system.29
In fluid resources, it is costly to achieve thingness in terms of both
delineation and forgone benefit. In other words, modularization is necessarily
incomplete because a system of interactions surrounding such resources is a
less decomposable system. On the cost side, clusters of uses are harder to
separate than they are in regular property. Physical fluidity, as is well known,
makes a resource hard to bound. It is very hard to contain water, measure its
flows (compared to measuring a solid object), and monitor use. If boundary
crossing can be used in the case of land as a proxy for violation in trespass and
in much of the law of nuisance, this is not possible in water law. And it is much
more difficult in the case of intellectual property than for tangible property.
Invention space is hard to describe, let alone to bound.30
At the same time, multiple uses of fluid resources are highly beneficial. In
some ways this is the flip side of the cost. If two uses of the resource are
valuable, then it is highly unlikely that they can be separated. So we will wind
up with a rights structure or a collection of privileges that can be characterized
as “multiple” use of a larger unbounded resource. Or we can delineate things,
but, again, it will be valuable for multiple actors to have “access.”
Once we allow for multiple access, strategic behavior becomes a danger.
In terms of the strategies for delineating property rights, we must either give up
on property rights altogether or move to some kind of governance regime.
Where multiple use is valuable, but not very separable, various more finegrained proxies will have to be used at the interface between legal modules (in
intellectual property, things like inventions or expressions) in order to prevent
(2012). On modularity, see, e.g., CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES: THE POWER
OF MODULARITY 58–59, 236–37, 257 (2000); HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL
209–10 (2d ed. 1981).
25. See generally Smith, Property as the Law of Things, supra note 24.
26. See generally id.
27. Id. at 1701.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719
(2009); Peter S. Menell, Governance of Intellectual Resources and Disintegration of Intellectual
Property in the Digital Age, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1523 (2011).
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damaging spillovers from activities. Again, this is not directly a matter of rival
use. If intellectual property gets indirectly at commercialization activities, the
question is how someone else’s activity might interfere with appropriability and
transferability. Relatively on/off violations of rights are just a crude first cut.
In fluid resources, this first cut is likely to be particularly rough. Put differently,
exclusion strategies, to the extent they can be used, will be especially indirect
in the case of fluid resources. And around this first cut, especially because of
its crudeness, we need to deal with strategic behavior.
All structures of property rights face what might be termed the Property
Dilemma. Property’s modularization and separation facilitate specialization.
Someone whose use is protected behind an exclusion strategy based on legal
things will be the residual claimant to that thing. As is true elsewhere, from
organizations to computer programs, modularization promotes specialization.
Owners can develop familiarity and even expertise in using their assets, secure
in the ability to reap the reward. Contracting for this kind of separation would
be prohibitively costly. Because this separation cannot be achieved by contract
alone, it is a true contribution of property law.31 Separation is an “essential
role” of property law.32
Separation cannot be complete. The system of interactions with respect to
resources is, after all, only nearly decomposable (if that). As a result,
modularization and separation lead to the potential for strategic behavior
(opportunism). First of all, owners will care excessively about their assets and
not for those of others or those of the public. This is the familiar externality
problem. But wherever proxies for protecting uses are inaccurate, we have to
worry about those who would exploit this gap. On the owner side, there can be
some spiteful behavior (spite fences) and what Dan Kelly calls strategic
externalities: engaging in an offensive land use in order to be paid off.33 A
classic example was the Chicago livery stable scam, in which someone would
quickly open a livery stable in a residential area solely in order to be paid to

31. See Brian Angelo Lee & Henry E. Smith, The Nature of Coasean Property, 59 INT’L REV.
ECON. 145–155 (2012).
32. See id. at 152; see also Henry E. Smith, Property as Platform: Coordinating Standards for
Technological Innovation, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1057, 1061 (2013). I take the term “essential
role” from Hansmann and Kraakman, who argued that affirmative asset-partitioning could not be
achieved by contract and so was the essential role of organizational law. Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 406–07 (2000). They noted
that asset partitioning was a “property” institution. Id. We can add that asset partitioning is a special
case of more general separation into modules. See Smith, Property as the Law of Things, supra note
24, at 1722.
33. See generally Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1667–68
(2011).
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shut down.34 Another type is extreme holdout behavior, which might be
described as abuse of right.35 As we will see, exercises of rights against their
purpose might lead to equitable withholding of remedies or even equitable
intervention. And the potential for opportunism exists on the non-owner side,
too. Even if a court gets damages right on average, a violator who can predict
error can cherry-pick entitlements to violate.36 This, too, could lead to
extortion.
Strategic behavior leads to the use of governance strategies to delineate
rights, and such governance strategies include equitable interventions. There
are many possible governance strategies, and it is an important question in
comparative institutional analysis, which is the least bad problem of strategic
behavior. Most straightforwardly, rules of proper use limit the amount of an
activity, such as grazing on a village common. Occasionally, clever boundary
placement can serve a governance function. In the semicommons of the
medieval open fields, carving the land into long thin strips in the private
property period made strategic behavior costlier.37 Additionally, and more
conventionally, rules of property use can be created by participants or
governments to contain strategic behavior.38 Many of the examples dealt with
by Elinor Ostrom involved large groups in control of a common pool of
resources instituting governance regimes to solve the problems of conflict and
overuse among themselves.39 Governance strategies will refer to particular
relatively narrow classes of use.40 In real property, governance devices include
servitudes, nuisance, and land use regulation.41 Each is supplied by a very
different set of institutional actors, but all focus in on particular classes of uses,
to a far greater extent than do exclusion strategies.
For very systematic problems, new forms of separation and governance
have been devised. One can separate out control from beneficial ownership
(the trust or corporation) or from possessory ownership (common-interest
communities). Far from being a challenge to notions of private property, as
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means thought,42 the separation of ownership and
34. Id. at 1645.
35. Id. at 1710–12.
36. See generally Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1774
(2004).
37. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights, supra note 8, at 132.
38. See generally id. at 138–44.
39. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); see also GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR
PROPERTY RIGHTS 29–34, 36–37 (1989).
40. Smith, supra note 7, at S455–56, S467–74.
41. Id. at S456.
42. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
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control is property-like separation of a different, more refined sort. Like other
forms of modularization, this allows specialization at some cost of strategic
behavior, including the agency costs familiar from the commentary on
corporate law.43 Tom Merrill and I have termed this kind of property that
allows for organizational-style separation “entity property.”44
Finally, an important set of governance tools comes under the heading of
equity. As I argue elsewhere, equity is a targeted “meta” law—law about law.45
Certain problems are worth the extra cost of solving at a higher level that can
override the results of regular law. In systems theory and cybernetics, this is
referred to as “hierarchy.”46 Among the problems calling for this second-order
intervention are what Lon Fuller called “polycentric tasks,” including complex
conflicting rights.47 They also notably include opportunism,48 or what used to
be called constructive fraud.49 As we will see, fluid property often involves
complex interactions—due to lack of separation—and openings for
opportunism. As expected, equity has played an important role in both areas.
II. MANAGING WATER
Water law has occupied an important and yet ambivalent place in property
theory. Water law is sometimes viewed as a challenge to conventional notions
of property, especially those notions based around exclusion.50 Ironically, it is
also used as support for such theories, at least when it comes to the emergence
of prior appropriation in the western United States.51
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

(1932).
43. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 355 (1976).
44. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 646–47
(2d ed. 2012).
45. Henry E. Smith, Equity as Second-Order Law: The Problem of Opportunism (Harvard Pub.
L., Working Paper No. 15-13, 2015).
46. See, e.g., Francis Heylighen & Cliff Joslyn, Cybernetics and Second-Order Cybernetics,
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 165 (R.A. Myers ed., New York:
Academic Press 3d ed. 2001). See generally A.Y. Aulin-Ahmavara, The Law of Requisite Hierarchy,
8 KYBERNETES 259–66 (1979).
47. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–95
(1978).
48. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 47 (1985). See
also Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW 261–84 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., Oxford University Press 2014).
49. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 327 (Hillard, Gray & Co. 1836).
50. Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1529, 1530 (1989).
51. Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law, 38 J.L. & ECON. 393,
429 (1995); see also CHARLES J. MEYERS & RICHARD A. POSNER, MARKET TRANSFERS OF WATER
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Seeing property as the elaboration of separation and modularization in a
system of complex interactions allows a different and more realistic account of
water law.52
Water is a fluid resource. It is a literal fluid, and this is reflected in water
law. Water is notoriously hard to delineate. In the formative period of water
law, very rough measurement in terms of type and length of use was the best
that could be done.53 Typically, measurement happens upon transfer (if
allowed), in order to protect those with the right to return flow.
Let’s start with riparianism, which is the system obtaining in most of the
United States and in England. Riparianism is based on reasonable use and thus
can be analogized to nuisance.54 It is, therefore, clearly a governance regime.
And, if anything, riparianism is moving further in that direction, as it is being
subjected to a regulatory overlay.
Yet there is more to riparianism than pure governance. First, riparian rights
are not open-ended. They are appurtenant to adjacent land.55 This gives them
an exclusive character even beyond the closed community that has access.56 By
being appurtenant to land, they become part of the modular package of rights
in land and thus rest on the foundation of exclusion in land law.57 Under
riparianism, water rights cannot be severed from riparian land, and doctrines to
prevent excessive fragmentation are required to police the rough proxy of
adjacency to the watercourse, which defines access in this exclusionary
regime.58 Further, water withdrawn from the watercourse can be used only on
riparian land.59 Even some of the use-governance has a rough modular
character, as where so-called natural wants such as drinking, household uses,
and cattle raising have per se priority over artificial wants such as irrigation (in
a nonarid climate) and power generation.60
As with nuisance, riparianism involves evaluating conflicting rights and
using rules of thumb to reconcile them. Often this is done in the course of
deciding on an injunction. Equity courts played a major role.

RIGHTS: TOWARD AN IMPROVED MARKET IN WATER RESOURCES 290 (National Water Commission,
Legal Study No. 4, NTIS No. NWC-L-71-009, July 1971) (proposing property rights to return flows).
52. Smith, Governing Water, supra note 6, at 447.
53. Nicole L. Johnson, Property Without Possession, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 205, 218–19 (2007).
54. Olivia S. Choe, Appurtenancy Reconceptualized: Managing Water in an Era of Scarcity,
113 YALE L.J. 1909, 1914 (2004).
55. Id. at 1916.
56. Id. at 1917, 1920.
57. Id. at 1917–18.
58. See generally id. at 1923–27.
59. Id. at 1923.
60. Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. 492, 495 (1842).
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Prior appropriation has received much attention from property theorists.
Often it is taken as an example of the Demsetz Thesis, in which property rights
emerge when resources increase in value and externalities become worse.61 In
arid climates, we thus get more “parcelized” water law, as exemplified in the
famous case of Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co.62 Carol Rose pointed out that the
use of water in the East had more public-goods characteristics than in the West,
and this helped shape water law in the two areas.63 Evidence of parcelization
comes from its system of priorities based on first diversion for a beneficial use,
and (in some times and places) its transferability.
While it is true that prior appropriation does put in effort to define rights in
water separately from land and in that sense is more exclusionary, upon closer
look, prior appropriation is very much a governance regime, in keeping with
the fluid character of the resource. First of all, rights are defined in terms of
use, and even quantification is based on rough measurement of use. Prior
appropriation does not give a right to all water diverted, but only so much as is
consumed in the particular pattern of use at the time of diversion.
Because of high measurement costs, and the benefits of multiple use, water
is difficult to separate and requires more emphasis on advanced forms of
separation and governance to contain strategic behavior.64 First of all, it is
necessary to acknowledge that, in both use and transfer, there remain many
important third-party effects.65 Partly this is the result of the desirability of
multiple use. Strikingly, return flows are appropriable by downstream users.
This probably allows for more thorough use of the watercourse at any given
time, but at the cost of making transfers more cumbersome.66 In a further
governance aspect of the system, transfers are subject to the no-injury rule,
which means that in a transfer the new diversion point and the new use cannot
place a greater impact on downstream junior appropriators than the old use
61. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights, supra note 8, at 143–44; Jedidiah Brewer, Robert
Glennon, Alan Ker & Gary Libecap, Transferring Water in the American West: 1987–2005, 40 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1021, 1024–25 (2007).
62. 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882). The court stated:
The climate is dry, and the soil, when moistened only by the usual rainfall, is arid and
unproductive; except in a few favored sections, artificial irrigation for agriculture is an
absolute necessity. Water in the various streams thus acquires a value unknown in moister
climates. Instead of being a mere incident to the soil, it rises, when appropriated, to the
dignity of a distinct usufructuary estate, or right of property.
63. Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights,
19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 262, 293–95 (1990).
64. See generally Smith, Governing Water, supra note 6; see also Freyfogle, supra note 48.
65. Ronald N. Johnson, Micha Gisser & Michael Werner, The Definition of a Surface Water
Right and Transferability, 24 J.L. & ECON. 273 (1981).
66. George A. Gould, Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party Effects, 23 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 1, 21 (1988); see also Johnson, Gisser & Werner, supra note 63, at 279–83.
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did.67 As with riparianism if not more so, prior appropriation is being overlaid
with public regulation.
Unlike riparianism, organizational—or entity—property plays a large role
in prior appropriation.68 Additional internalization is achieved by institutions
that can be characterized as entity property.69 Mutuals and water districts allow
for separation of a group or a watershed for separate legal treatment.70 They
promote modules of an extended sort. Within these overall modules, there is
separation of function inside the entity, in terms of management and use.71
Water entities, especially mutuals, make intra-entity transfers of water much
smoother than corresponding external transfers.72 Water districts mix entity
property and public functions.73
Finally, equity has played a major role in prior appropriation law.74 This is
expressed in the full arsenal of equitable principles, such as maxims and
defenses, when courts consider injunctions.75 Courts also can draw on equitable
apportionment doctrine to solve particular problems of conflicting rights in
interstate contexts.76 Apportionment is a classic example of the second-order
solution to problems of complex, conflicting rights. And equity courts had
historic equity jurisdiction over custom, which was a source of early priorappropriation water law.77
In both riparian and prior-appropriation systems, private and public rights
interlock so tightly that it makes sense to see them as different versions of
semicommons.78 The elaborate structures are a response to the access afforded
by the mix of private and common property elements in the system of water
law.

67. Freyfogle, supra note 50, at 1539.
68. See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and
Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1993).
69. Id. at 718–20.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id.; Smith, Governing Water, supra note 6, at 472.
74. Duane Rudolph, Why Prior Appropriation Needs Equity, 18 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.
348, 351–52 (2015).
75. Id. at 365–66.
76. Id. at 351–52.
77. See generally DAVID SCHORR, THE COLORADO DOCTRINE: WATER RIGHTS,
CORPORATIONS, AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER (2012); MARK
KANAZAWA, GOLDEN RULES: THE ORIGINS OF CALIFORNIA WATER LAW IN THE GOLD RUSH (2015).
78. Smith, Governing Water, supra note 6, at 449–50.
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III. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SEMICOMMONS
Information is a fluid resource, as discussed earlier. As with water,
separation and exclusion are costly, and multiple interlocking uses are
desirable. Thus, from both ends, intellectual property cannot rely on even
nearly accurate rules of access. The on/off proxies on offer do an even worse
job than those in tangible property at getting at the class of uses we are
interested in. This is particularly true because the proxies used in intellectual
property are at some remove from the rival resources they are protecting—the
resources that go into commercialization, in particular.79 Thus, what we are left
with are crude exclusion devices and heavier use of governance. In intellectual
property, we find both.
To begin with, exclusion has its limits in intellectual property. This is well
known in some of its aspects. Nevertheless, exclusion serves a similar function
to that in regular property—but at some remove. Intellectual property and
patent law, in particular, employ modular, indirect exclusion rights to help solve
a complex coordination problem of attributing returns to rival inputs to
development of nonrival information.80 Because accurate exclusion proxies are
unavailable, a combination of crude exclusion and extensive governance must
be used (if anything will be).81 A major difference between patent and
copyright is that there is more reliance in the former on crude exclusion than
there is in copyright.82 Modularity is particularly important in patent law where
commercialization looms large.83 And thing-style delineation is probably even
more difficult in copyright than in patent law.84 As is familiar, an expression
is inherently difficult to isolate. Copyright employs use more in terms of
entitlement definition.85
In both patent and copyright, the semicommons is a major element, and
much of the recent work on semicommons comes from the intellectual property
area.86 The doctrine of fair use in copyright creates a semicommons where
79. See generally Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, supra note 18,
at 2090–2113.
80. See generally id.; Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating
Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1751–53 (2007).
81. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property, supra note 80, at 1817–19.
82. Id. at 1800.
83. See generally id. at 1814–15.
84. Id. at 1799–1800.
85. Id. at 1799–1814.
86. See BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES
302–03 (2012); see also Robert A. Heverly, The Information Semicommons, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1127, 1184 (2003); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1, 11 (2005); Lydia Pallas Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works:
Enforcement of Creative Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright, 14 GEO. MASON
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private and public rights interact over the same resource.87 In patent law, norms
of scientific research have, at least until recently, allowed for sharing with
fellow academics and private exclusion with respect to commercial users.88
Many of the collective-rights and standardizing organizations that grow up
around intellectual property rights mix private and public rights in a
semicommons.89
Indeed, when holders of intellectual property rights contract in a group, the
result is often a complex mix of private and group entitlements. This goes for
contracts for joint ventures and looser organizations governing collective
rights, such as copyright organizations and patent pools. It is even true in a
limited way in standard-setting organizations, where much attention has been
given to the problems of potential strategic behavior in which participants will
let their (perhaps hidden) private intellectual property interests affect their
behavior with respect to deliberations on the choice of standards.90 A variety
of governance mechanisms, including equitable intervention, are used (and can
be used further) to contain such strategic behavior.91
As in regular property, servitudes are also a major contracted-for source of
governance for intellectual property. In intellectual property, licenses tend to
be more robust than in regular property. They are the means by which owners
of intellectual property can set up a governance structure around specific rights.
Through doctrines like exhaustion in patent law and first sale in copyright law,
the law sets limits on what can be accomplished through intellectual property
licenses, and some limits make sense in keeping property rights from becoming
too idiosyncratic and expansive. Intellectual property licenses present
problems that go beyond those of regular property. Molly Van Houweling
shows that these “new servitudes” present greater problems of notice and the
potential to conflict downstream.92 These problems are related to the fluid
nature of the property. As an example of conflict, Van Houweling considers
GPL Version 2 and the Wikipedia GNU Free Documentation License, each of
which requires licensees who are incorporating the work to license their own
work on the same terms.93 The specific terms of openness can require different
L. REV. 271, 296–97 (2007); Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, supra note
18; see also Jonathan M. Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1751, 1761
(2010).
87. See generally Heverly, supra note 86, at 1183–84.
88. Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific
Research, 13 SOCIAL PHIL. & POL’Y 145, 157–59 (Summer 1996).
89. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, supra note 18, at 2111.
90. Smith, Property as Platform, supra note 32, 1079–80.
91. Id. at 1059, 1078–88.
92. See generally Molly S. Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008).
93. Id. at 941–42.
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conflicting actions.94 This is less of a problem in real property, in which
easements are tied to non-overlapping areas. Likewise, “new servitudes” can
exceed the entitlement baseline, as Microsoft’s Vista EULA exceeded the
copyright baseline.95 By contrast, in real property, the thing-based bubble
around land (and similarly for chattels) prevents this leakage from the modules.
Finally, equity has a role to play in countering strategic behavior in
intellectual property law. As Gergen, Golden, and I have argued, when the
United States Supreme Court adopted in eBay v. MercExchange96—under the
banner of “traditional principles of equity,” a novel four-part test for issuing
injunctions, it replaced, ironically, a more traditional approach that was tailored
well for dealing with opportunistic behavior.97 Under the eBay test, the movant
must show:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that
the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.98
Unlike the truly traditional approach to injunctions, this test makes no
reference to good faith, which is directly tied to opportunism. Although the test
mentions “disproportionate hardship,” traditionally that formula described a
safety valve in situations where an injunction would normally issue, but where
there was gross disparity of hardship on the defendant. The disproportionate or
undue hardship defense was not a balancing test seeking equipoise.99 When
dealing with opportunism, there is a strong case for the traditional
disproportionate-hardship defense in the patent realm.100 Also, the traditional
94. Eliminating this problem of potential conflict required elaborate and controversial
relicensing by the Wikimedia Foundation. Niva Elkin-Koren, Tailoring Copyright to Social
Production, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 309, 340–41 (2011).
95. See generally Van Houweling, supra note 92 at 941–42.
96. eBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006). The Court has employed
this test outside the patent context. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156 (2010).
97. See Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental
Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 243–45 (2012).
98. eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 391.
99. Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 97, at 246; see also Douglas Laycock, The Neglected
Defense of Undue Hardship (and the Doctrinal Train Wreck in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement), 4 J. TORT
L. 3, 29–31 (2011).
100. See Herbert F. Schwartz, Injunctive Relief in Patent Infringement Suits, 112 U. PA. L.
REV. 1025, 1045–46 (1964); see also Vincenzo Denicolò, Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar & A.
Jorge Padilla, Revisiting Injunctive Relief: Interpreting eBay in High-Tech Industries with NonPracticing Patent Holders, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 571, 602–03 (2008); Smith, Institutions and
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gross-disparity approach allowed courts to take into account the possibility of
opportunism not just on the part of patent-owning trolls, but also on the part of
potential infringers, who might use the possibility of undercompensatory
damages as a weapon.101
Likewise, in standard-setting organizations, some of the problems of
opportunism can be handled by equity. Doctrines like unclean hands and
estoppel—in addition to the real, traditional approach to injunctions—can
counteract unfair surprise that may come up.102 Limited enforcement of custom
can also have an anti-opportunism effect.
CONCLUSION
Property rights involve separation along various dimensions, promoting
specialization at the cost of inviting strategic behavior. Because separation is
especially difficult and multiple use is especially important in fluid resources,
fluid property is likely to be subject to a semicommons. In property—
“regular,” intellectual, and entity—a range of governance regimes, some off the
rack and some contractual, can deal partially with strategic behavior stemming
from separation. These tools are especially prominent in both water law and
intellectual property, as expected for a fluid property regime.

Indirectness in Intellectual Property, supra note 18, at 2131; Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 97;
cf. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 165–69 (2011).
101. Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and
the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 390 (2007); see also Smith, Property as Platform, supra
note 32, at 1084; see generally Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 36.
102. Smith, Property as Platform, supra note 32, at 1078–88.

